out-group members diminishes prejudice. However, if LGBs come out primarily to people they expect to be accepting, heterosexuals' support for gay rights might be the cause as much as the effect of having LGB friends and acquaintances, and the causal impact of coming out could be much more limited.
To assess the impact of knowing LGBs, I re-estimate the link using individuallevel data from 27 surveys of nationally representative samples conducted since 1983.
Stage One examines whether the same characteristics that predict support for LGB rights also predict knowing LGBs, especially as friends. If they do, it is more important to control for them in assessing the impact of knowing LGBs on support for gay rights, and it is more likely that other, unobserved factors also influence both; failing to control for those factors will tend to overstate the impact of contact. Stage Two looks at whether knowing LGBs increases support for LGB rights, even after controlling for all the observable factors, and whether the policy issue, the type of contact with LGBs, and the characteristics of respondents affect the size of the impact. I find that younger, more educated, female, less religious, and more liberal respondents are all more likely both to know LGBs and to support LGB rights, but that age, education, gender, religion, and liberalism have different effects on contact than on support. Even controlling for this two-way causation, however, knowing LGBs appears to have a substantial impact on support for LGB rights -an impact that is reasonably similar for all relationship types, all policy issues, all types of respondents, and all years.
Linking Acquaintance with LGBs to Support for Gay Rights
Coming out as a political strategy fits well with strong theoretical and empirical support for the hypothesis that intergroup contact reduces prejudice (Allport 1954) .
Personal interactions tend to increase "liking" and diminish "intergroup anxiety" (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 767) . Contact, especially prolonged contact that develops into friendship, allows "learning about the outgroup, changing behavior, generating affective ties, and ingroup reappraisal," which are all key processes in overcoming prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 80) . Allport (1958) argues that contact has its greatest impact when encounters are marked by "equal status ..., common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities, law, or custom" (Pettigrew 1998, 66) . Meta-analysis of 515 empirical studies confirms that contact with out-groups lowers prejudice, but it also shows that Allport's conditions are not necessary for a positive impact, though they "enhance the tendency for positive contact outcomes to emerge" (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 766) . The positive effect appears to occur whether contact is voluntary or involuntary, and the most rigorous studies, where contact is experimentally created, show the strongest effects.
Anti-LGB prejudice may be especially susceptible to intergroup contact, because most LGBs "pass" as heterosexual in many situations, and heterosexuals often learn they have been interacting with LGBs only after establishing a relationship. Many of those relationships have ideal attributes for attitude change: equal status, cooperation toward common goals, or friendship. Especially in relationships with close friends or relatives, affective ties should push heterosexuals toward intergroup learning (e.g., asking what it means to be gay) and behavioral change (e.g., making fewer anti-gay jokes), important steps in eliminating prejudice (Pettigrew 1998) . The Pettigrew and Tropp metaanalysis (2006, 763) finds that contact with LGBs typically has stronger effects than contact with racial, ethnic, or other minorities.
The existing empirical analyses have limits in establishing what impact knowing
LGBs has on support for gay rights, however. Many studies are based on samples of college students, who are not representative of the population in their characteristics, contact with LGBs, or support for gay rights. Most studies look at attitudes toward homosexuality or LGBs rather than at policy issues. Some analyses of nationally representative samples provide only simple comparisons of those who do and do not know LGBs, or control for only a few of the many variables that could influence both support for gay rights and acquaintance with LGBs (e.g., Schneider and Lewis 1984) , though more recent work (Bramlett 2010; Herek and Capitanio 1995, 1996; Herek and Glunt 1993; Skipworth, Garner, and Dettrey 2010; Wilcox and Wolpert 2000) have shown a strong impact of knowing LGBs, especially as friends, using multivariate analysis of representative national samples.
Most studies rely on self-reported, voluntary contact with out-group members, meaning that the apparent impact of contact may be over-estimated because the strongly prejudiced can avoid contact. 2 LGB-heterosexual contact creates special complexities, because most LGBs can pass as straight in many situations. This gives the strongly prejudiced less ability to avoid intergroup contact (because they may not be able to identify LGBs), but the effect of contact may be weaker (if they remain ignorant that they know LGBs). Because LGBs have more control than most out-groups over whether to reveal their out-group status, they can balance the potential benefits of a more satisfying, honest relationship with the dangers of rejection (Woods 1993) .
LGBs are more likely to come out if they perceive more rewards from an honest relationship (perhaps because they see real possibilities for friendship) or fewer dangers from coming out (because they perceive little chance of, or cost to, rejection).
At a minimum, analysis of the impact of knowing LGBs requires controlling for characteristics that affect both one's probability of knowing LGBs and one's support for gay rights. In deciding whom to come out to, LGBs may use heterosexuals' likely attitudes toward homosexuality and LGB rights as indicators of the rewards of knowing them better and of the danger of rejection. Research on attitudes toward homosexuality and support for LGB rights finds several consistent patterns (see Herek (2000) for a review of the research). Female, younger, more educated, less religious, and more liberal people generally have more positive attitudes. Jewish and non-religious people tend to be the more supportive than Catholics and mainline Protestants, who are more supportive than evangelical Protestants. Support declines with religiosity. Other patterns are less clear. Blacks are more likely than whites to condemn homosexual behavior as morally wrong, but they may be more likely to support gay rights laws . Although the Democratic and Republican parties take very different positions on gay rights, partisan differences at the grass roots level are weaker, but growing (Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002) . Living in areas with high concentrations of LGBs should make acquaintance more likely, and living in more accepting environments should make LGBs more likely to come out to straight acquaintances.
If
LGBs choose to come out primarily to people who accept homosexuality, then gender, age, education, religion, and ideology, and perhaps race and party identification should all affect one's probability of knowing LGBs. These variables should have more effect on whether one has LGB friends than family members or acquaintances, because friendship requires choice. If these characteristics strongly influence one's probability of knowing LGBs, especially as friends, other characteristics not included in the survey data may also have important effects on both their relationships with LGBs and their positions on LGB issues, leading to over-estimates of the impact of knowing LGBs.
If knowing
LGBs increases support for LGB rights, its effects may still vary across relationship types, demographic groups, policy issues, and time. Friends and family are more likely than acquaintances to have the kinds of conversations that produce attitude change (Herek and Capitanio 1996; Pettigrew 1998) , and friendships with out-group members have more impact on prejudice than do less intense forms of contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) . Barth and Parry (2009) find that knowing LGB couples increases support for legal recognition of same-sex relationships more than knowing
LGB individuals. Though models of attitudes toward homosexuality and LGB rights typically assume that the same factors affect all groups similarly, finds very different patterns for blacks and whites. Two recent studies find that contact with
LGBs has weaker effects on conservatives, evangelicals, and Southerners (Bramlett 2010; Skipworth, Garner, and Dettrey 2010) . (Barth and Overby (2003) find a similar weaker effect in the South without direct measures of contact.) Those strongly opposed to LGB rights on religious or political grounds might not only avoid contact with LGBs but be impervious to interactions with LGBs when they do occur -loving the sinner but hating the sin, or viewing their LGB friends as exceptions who reveal little about the group. Political conservatives might oppose "special rights" for minorities so strongly that friendship cannot overcome that objection. Impact could be stronger on issues on which Americans are split fairly evenly than on those with very high or very low support.
As more heterosexuals know LGBs, as LGBs become more visible in the media, and as support for LGB rights increases, the impact of contact could grow or shrink as some
LGB issues (e.g., employment discrimination) become less controversial and others (e.g., marriage) become more controversial.
Data and Methods
Using the iPOLL search engine of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, I identified 39 polls that asked respondents whether they knew LGBs. I was able to Stage One models who knows LGBs, using several strategies to cope with the complications created by 27 surveys using 18 different questions to establish LGB acquaintance and by several not asking crucial demographic, political, or religious questions. First, I combine all 27 surveys, ignore question wording, and calculate the percentage of each group who answered "Yes" to whichever Knows LGB question they were asked. Second, I perform logit analysis on a combined sample of 15 surveys that have fairly consistent measures of gender, race, education, age, religion, and political ideology. Third, I run separate logit analyses on each of the 27 data sets, using the most detailed measures of religion, political ideology, party identification, gender, race, education, and age available in that data set. Fourth, I follow up with separate models predicting LGB friends, family members, and co-workers or acquaintances on surveys that ask multiple questions about contact with LGBs; stronger results for friends would strengthen evidence that one's attitudes affect one's probability of knowing LGBs.
In the combined analysis, dummy variables distinguish men from women (the reference group) and blacks and other minorities from whites (the reference group).
Education is measured in years. I represent age with a set of dummy variables for the decade in which respondents were born (with the 1950s as the reference group. Dummy variables distinguish Catholic, Jews, members of another religion, or the nonreligious from Protestants (the reference group). Dummy variables also distinguish the very liberal, liberal, conservative, and very conservative from moderates (the reference group).
In the logits on individual surveys, I add (when possible) dummy variables for Latinos, Asians, born-again or evangelical Protestants, and those who attend religious services at least almost every week or who say religion is very important in their lives. I treat ideology and party identification as "linear" variables. Ideology is measured on a 3-or 5-point scale from (very) liberal to (very) conservative, and party identification is measured on a 3-, 5-, or 7-point scale from (strong) Democrat to (strong) Republican. To translate the logit coefficients into probability differences, I estimate the expected impact of knowing someone gay for each individual in each data set. That is, I
calculate each individual's expected probability of giving the LGB-positive response twice, once assuming the person knows LGBs and once assuming he/she does not. (I use the Stata predict command twice, once setting Knows LGB to 1 and once setting it to 0.) I calculate the probability difference for each individual and the mean of those probability differences for the data set. (For the advantage of this method, see the discussion of the average partial effect in Wooldridge (2009, 583) .) I then calculate the mean of the average partial effects, weighting each survey equally.
As an initial test of whether having LGB friends has a bigger impact than knowing
LGBs in other ways, I summarize the findings separately for surveys where the question clearly asks whether the respondent has an LGB friend and those where the LGB contact either might not be or clearly is not a friend. To see whether the impact of knowing
LGBs varies by policy issue, I summarize the findings separately for beliefs about homosexuality, opposition to employment discrimination, support for relationship recognition, opposition to sodomy laws, and support for gay rights laws. To see whether the impact of knowing LGBs has changed over time, I summarize by survey year.
Second, I try to control for the fact that demographic factors do not capture all the information LGBs have in deciding whether to come out to others. Heterosexuals whose characteristics suggest one level of acceptance may signal that they are actually much more or less accepting. I repeat the logit models for the LGB rights questions, controlling for beliefs about homosexuality. These beliefs, especially about the morality of homosexual relations, provide important information to LGBs about the value or danger of coming out to them, but they may have less impact on policy positions, as
Americans increasingly "bracket" their moral concerns about homosexuality in thinking about LGB rights (Ball 2003; Brewer 2003; Lewis 2005) . These logit models estimate the impact of knowing LGBs on support for LGB rights among similar people with similar attitudes toward homosexuality. As knowing LGBs probably affects beliefs about homosexuality and vice versa, the first set of models probably overstates the impact of knowing LGBs, while the second set under-estimates it.
These questions are not available in all surveys (dropping the number of analyses to 89), and they vary in their focus. Several surveys ask whether homosexual relations are morally wrong or sinful; that belief is the strongest predictor of opposition to samesex marriage, though it has less impact on other LGB rights issues (Lewis 2005 Yankelovich poll, for instance, asks questions about both an LGB "close friend" and an
LGB family member.) I enter separate dummy variables for each way of knowing LGBs and test whether their effects differ. If having LGB friends or knowing same-sex couples has a bigger impact, their coefficients should be larger and more significant.
Fourth, to test whether knowing
LGBs has more impact on some groups than others, I combine data for 11 surveys that ask at least two questions on homosexuality and/or LGB rights that can be combined into indexes with Cronbach's alphas of at least .70 (they vary between .72 and .95). I create my dependent variable by standardizing each index to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. I regress this measure on whether one knows LGBs separately by level of education, decade of birth, ideology, party identification, gender, race/ethnicity, religious intensity, and religious affiliation, controlling for all the other variables. These models also include dummy variables for each survey to control for time, question wording, and house effects.
Fifth, I regress that combined measure on all these variables simultaneously (without religious affiliation, the sample size is 11,621; with it, the sample size drops to 7,861 4 ). I run each model three times, once for those who do not know any LGBs, once for those who do, and once on the combined sample with interaction terms between
Knows
LGBs and all the other independent variables. Coefficients on these interaction terms replicate the differences between the coefficients on the same variable in the first two models. If knowing LGBs has the same impact on all sub-groups, the coefficients on the variables will be about the same for those who do and do not LGBs and very few coefficients on the interaction terms will be statistically significant.
Who Knows LGBs?
Women are more likely than men to know LGBs. In the 27 surveys combined, ignoring question wording, 47% of the women and only 40% of the men said they knew
LGBs. In the combined analysis of 15 surveys (Table 1) , the highly significant logit coefficient (-.467) indicates that a woman is 11 percentage points more likely than a comparable man to know LGBs (63% versus 52%) if both have the characteristics of the base person. In 31 individual logit analyses on the 27 data sets, controlling for whatever demographics were available, women were significantly more likely than similar men to know LGBs in 24 and gender was the most important predictor 5 in 7.
[ Table 1 about here]
More educated people are more likely to know LGBs. Overall, 63% of those with graduate degrees and only 30% of those who did not complete high school know LGBs.
In the combined analysis, an additional year of education raises our base person's probability of knowing LGBs by 3.4 percentage points. The education coefficient is positive and significant in 24 of 30 models on individual surveys, and it has the largest standardized odds-ratio in 9 of them. LGBs. I drop party identification from the combined logit analysis, because it shrinks the sample but does not have a statistically significant effect. Without party identification in the models, liberals are 13 percentage points more likely than similar conservatives to know LGBs, and strong liberals are 23 percentage points more likely than strong conservatives to do so. Conservatism has a significant negative coefficient in 8 of 18 surveys that include ideology.
Race differences are small. Overall the percentages of whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians who know LGBs vary only between 44% and 46%. With the full set of controls, African Americans and other minorities are 4 percentage points less likely than similar whites to know LGBs. In separate logits, the black coefficient is negative in 21 models (significantly 7 times), but it is positive 10 times (significantly twice). Table 2 reports separate logit analyses for whether one has close LGB friends, family members, and coworkers in seven surveys that ask about them separately, and for whether one knows same-sex couples and LGB individuals in two surveys that ask about both. Comparing the models for having LGB friends and family members confirms that we choose our friends more than our families: the McFadden's R 2 is approximately twice as strong in the friend as in the family models.
Friends versus Family.
The clearest differences are for education and age. Better-educated respondents are much more likely to have LGB friends but not relatives. Younger respondents are more likely to have both LGB friends and family members, but the age effect is twice as strong for friends. In contrast, blacks are significantly less likely than whites to have LGB friends in one survey but significantly more likely to have LGB family members in another; Latinos and Republicans may also be less likely than non-Hispanic whites and independents, respectively, to have LGB friends but not relatives. The model also does a better job of explaining whether people know LGB individuals rather than same-sex couples, mostly due to the stronger effects of conservatism and age. Blacks are less likely than comparable whites to know same-sex couples but not LGB individuals.
[ Table 2 about here] Discussion. Many patterns suggest that people who know LGBs probably already had more accepting attitudes toward homosexuality. Younger, more educated, female, less religious, and more liberal respondents are more likely both to support LGB rights and to know LGBs. Those effects are larger for having LGB friends than acquaintances or family members, suggesting that the more choice is involved in the contact with
LGBs, the more important is an openness to LGBs that makes one more likely to support
LGB rights. Models that do not control for predictors of support for LGB rights may dramatically overstate the impact of contact with LGBs, and even models with many control variables will probably overstate the impact having LGB friends, as they fail to control for an unobserved propensity both to befriend LGBs and to support LGB rights.
Having LGB co-workers, acquaintances, or family members may give more unbiased estimates, as these relationships are more accidental than friendships.
On the other hand, many of these variables have smaller effects on knowing LGBs than on support for same-sex marriage, for instance. Age has little impact on knowing
LGBs: today's 25-year-olds are barely more likely to know LGBs than similar 65-yearolds, but they are 24 percentage points more likely to support same-sex marriage (Lewis 2010) . Religion effects are small: Jewish and non-religious people are only 4 to 8 percentage points more likely than comparable Protestants to know LGBs, but 13 to 18 points more likely to support same-sex marriage (Lewis and Oh 2006) . Mainline and evangelical Protestants do not differ significantly in their acquaintance with LGBs, but they differ by 18 points on marriage equality. Strong Democrats are not significantly more likely to know LGBs than similar strong Republicans, but they are 25 percentage points more likely to favor same-sex marriage. Liberals are 13 percentage points more likely than conservatives to know LGBs but 47 percentage points more likely to favor marriage rights. Black-white and male-female differences are reasonably similar on knowing LGBs and favoring marriage equality, but education has a 50 percent larger impact on knowing LGBs than on supporting same-sex marriage. In sum, though similar variables influence both knowing LGBs and supporting their rights, the differences are substantial enough to indicate that they are far from the same thing.
The Impact of Knowing LGBs
Knowing LGBs substantially increases acceptance of homosexuality and support for LGB rights. Table 3 summarizes results from 299 logit analyses that control for all the demographic variables available in each data set. The 210 models that do not control for beliefs about homosexuality indicate that those who know LGBs are, on average, 12.7 percentage points more likely to give the LGB-positive response than demographically, politically, and religiously similar people who do not.
[ Table 3 about here]
Knowing
LGBs in any capacity has an impact. In the 84 models where the respondent clearly has an LGB friend, the difference is 13.5 percentage points; in the 126 models where the LGB known could be a friend, family member, coworker, or acquaintance, the difference drops slightly to 12.2 percentage points. The difference is somewhat larger in models that compare individuals who also have similar beliefs about whether homosexuality is innate, acceptable, and/or morally wrong. Those with LGB friends are still 13.4 points more likely to support LGB rights than those who do not, but when the relationship could be something other than a friendship, the gap drops to 10.1 points.
LGB friends may get past other beliefs about homosexuality that co-workers or family members cannot, but even weaker relationships overcome some preconceptions. Table 4 restricts the analysis to surveys that ask questions about how one knows
LGBs and reports models that include separate dummy variables for each type of relationship. In the 1994 Yankelovich poll, for instance, having an LGB "close friend" has a strong impact on support for each right listed, but having an LGB family member has a clearly significant additional impact only on support for marriage (though the effects on morality, legality, and civil rights laws are also significant at the .05 level in one-tailed tests). In Harris, having a "close personal friend" increases the probability that one favors marriage, supports adoption rights, and believes LGBs cannot change their sexual orientation (but not on whether one favors a gay rights law), with or without controlling for beliefs about the changeability of sexual orientation. Having an LGB family member, however, has no additional impact on any dependent variable. Five Newsweek/PSRA polls between 1994 and 2000 ask whether respondents "work with someone you know is gay," then whether they "have a gay person in your family," and then whether they "have a friend or acquaintance who is gay." The friendship does not have to be as close as in the previous two surveys, but it should be more than a coworker. All three types of relationships have significant positive impacts on support for
LGB rights (partly due to the larger sample size), but a friend or acquaintance matters more than a family member or coworker in every case. In contrast, the two CBS News/New York Times polls suggest little difference from knowing LGB individuals or couples: each has an independent impact of approximately the same size.
[ Table 4 about here]
LGBs matters for all policy issues. Although the estimated size of the effect varies somewhat, the basic patterns are the same for all dependent variables (Table 3 ). In the 12 surveys that ask about innateness, genetics, or choice, the logit coefficient on Knows LGB is always statistically significant. Although only one-third believes homosexuality is something people are born with, those who know LGBs are 8 percentage points more likely than comparable others to believe that (Table 3) . Those who know LGBs are 14 points more likely to call homosexuality an acceptable alternative lifestyle and 11 points more likely to reject the claim that homosexual relations are morally wrong or sinful.
Those who know LGBs are substantially more likely to support gay rights across the board. In the 143 models that do not include beliefs about homosexuality as control variables, the effect of knowing LGBs is statistically significant in all but five. Those who know LGBs are significantly more likely than comparable others to favor nondiscrimination in principle and in law, to support LGBs teaching school and serving openly in the military, to oppose sodomy laws, to favor civil unions and same-sex marriage, and to support adoption and inheritance rights for same-sex couples. There is some variation across issues: in seven surveys that ask about both civil unions and same-sex marriage, the Knows LGB coefficient is consistently larger in the civil union model. Still, for each issue included in at least four surveys, the mean logit coefficient varies only between .59 and 1.15 (for supporting gay rights laws and for hiring homosexuals as doctors or high school teachers, respectively) and the mean percentage difference varies between 10 and 24 points. (The difference is so small on equal rights in terms of job opportunity largely because support for the principle is high even among those who do not know LGBs).
LGBs affects attitudes for all groups throughout this period. The impact of contact with LGBs does not appear to have changed much since 1983. The questions vary from year to year, but Figure 1 shows the mean difference in percentages accepting homosexuality and supporting LGB rights between those who do and do not know LGBs has not changed much over the years. The confidence intervals make the stability even clearer.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Does knowing
LGBs have more impact on some groups than others? Figure 2 shows the impact of knowing LGBs on a standardized index of support for LGB rights; it is the coefficient on Knows LGBs from regressions run separately for each group. For the entire group (N=11,621), the mean effect is a .55 standard deviation increase in support for LGB rights. The point estimates vary, but the effect is statistically significant for every group, including one as small as Asian Americans (N=145). Four differences stand out. Knowing LGBs has significantly larger effects for liberals and moderates than for conservatives, for Democrats than for Republicans, for mainline Protestants than for evangelicals, and for women than for men.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Controlling for all these variables simultaneously alters these findings somewhat (Table 5 ). In general, the independent variables have similar effects on support for LGB rights for those who do and do not know LGBs. As in most previous research on public opinion on LGB rights, support rises strongly with education and with each new birth cohort. Support is much higher for liberals than conservatives and somewhat higher for Democrats than Republicans (holding ideology constant). Jewish, non-religious, and Catholic respondents are more supportive than mainline Protestants, who are more supportive than evangelical Protestants. Women support LGB rights more than men, and whites support them more than blacks, until we control for blacks' higher propensity to be evangelical Protestants.
[ Table 5 about here] The highly significant difference between the constants represents the expected impact of knowing LGBs for a white, female, moderate, independent high school graduate born in the 1950s (who is also a mainline Protestant in the second set of equations). Knowing LGBs has significantly less impact for better-educated individuals (as suggested but not demonstrated by Figure 2 ). Knowing LGBs has more impact on liberals. That impact weakens somewhat when religion (in particular, whether one is an evangelical Protestant) is added to the model, but the difference between liberals and conservatives is still .24 wider for those who do than for those who do not know LGBs (the liberal-conservative difference is .496 for those who do not know LGBs and .737 for those who do, significantly different at the .01 level). Knowing LGBs has about the same impact on Republicans and Democrats, however, once the other variables are held constant, suggesting that conservatism and evangelism rather than party identification explains the partisan difference in Figure 2 . Knowing LGBs has similar effects for most religious groups, but less impact on evangelical than mainline Protestants even with the full set of controls. The impact is nearly identical for black and white evangelicals, however. Knowing LGBs has similar effects for men and women and for whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians. It also has about the same impact for those born any time before 1980, but a significantly larger effect for those born in the 1980s.
Discussion. In general, knowing LGBs seems to have less impact for those predisposed to strongly oppose LGB rights: contact has the least impact on religious and political conservatives, as Skipworth, Garner, and Dettrey (2010) and Bramlett (2010) have also found. Contact also has the most impact on those born in the 1980s, who are also the cohort most likely to support LGB rights. The one counter-example is that knowing LGBs has more impact for less-educated people, who tend to be less supportive of LGB rights. Perhaps this means that the less-educated tend to have less firmly held beliefs and are therefore more open to being swayed by personal contact.
Even for groups most strongly opposed to LGB rights, however, knowing LGBs seems to have a substantial impact on acceptance of homosexuality and support for gay rights. The Knows LGBs coefficient is statistically significant in virtually every model -for all dependent variables, in all years, for all sub-groups, with or without controlling for attitudes toward homosexuality. The effect is stronger if the respondent has an LGB friend than if the relationship is less intimate or less voluntary, but the difference is only about 10 to 20 percent stronger when we know the respondent has an LGB friend than when we don't know the nature of the relationship. In analysis of surveys that asked about multiple types of relationships, LGB friends matter more than LGB coworkers or family members, but the latter usually have effects as well.
Knowing
LGBs might affect opposition to hiring and employment discrimination more than support for couple recognition, but it still increases support for civil unions and marriage rights by 10-12 percentage points. In every sub-group, those who know
LGBs support LGB rights more than those who do not. The effect is strongest for the youngest respondents, for liberals, and for less-educated respondents, but it is substantial even for college-educated conservatives 7 . The effect of knowing LGBs is weakened when we control for beliefs about the innateness, acceptability, and morality of homosexuality, but even when we compare individuals with the same beliefs, those who know LGBs are more likely to support LGB rights.
Conclusion
As LGB activists have long argued, coming out to straight friends, family, and colleagues is likely to have a positive political impact. Heterosexuals who know that they know LGBs are more likely than others to support employment and relationship rights for LGBs. Part of the reason is that people who know LGBs tend to have other characteristics that make them more likely to accept homosexuality and support LGB rights, suggesting that LGBs are more likely to come out to those less likely to reject them. However, even controlling for many factors that might influence both support for
LGB rights and probability of having LGB friends, knowing a lesbian or gay man has a noticeable impact on support for gay rights. The impact is meaningful even among similar people with the same beliefs about the morality and origins of homosexuality.
As others have found (Bramlett 2010; Skipworth, Garner, and Dettrey 2010) , the impact is smaller for political conservatives and evangelical Protestants, but even for them contact appears to increase support by .25 standard deviation. Though strong political or religious objections to LGB rights weaken the impact of personal contact, they do not eliminate them. An impact of 10 to 20 percentage points holds across issues, time, and demographic groups. Personalizing same-sex marriage increases support, both for people whose political leanings and moral judgments would suggest no problems with the concept and for those whose politics and religion suggests strong opposition.
The percentage of Americans reporting that they know LGBs has grown rapidly.
In 1983, one-quarter had "any friends or acquaintances who are homosexual" Does contact matter for other policy issues? The contact hypothesis indicates that acquaintance with racial/ethnic minorities will increase support for minority interests. Effects should generalize to contacts with the poor and with undocumented immigrants. Serwer (2010) suggests that one reason public opinion has shifted so much on gay rights and remained so stable on abortion, the other pre-eminent morality politics issue of our time, is that the "abortion closet" has protected "noxious stereotypes" about the kind of women who get abortions; knowing encounters with women or couples who have chosen abortions could force people to test those stereotypes against real people. Personalizing same-sex marriage changes opinions, both for people whose political leanings and moral judgments would suggest no problems with the concept and for those whose politics and religion suggests strong opposition. Making a personal connection on abortion or illegal immigration might have similar effects. McFadden's pseudo-R 2 .159 Observations 22,393 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Source: Sample combines 15 surveys. The model also includes dummy variables for state, survey question, and year. The third column translates the constant into the probability of knowing LGBS for the "base" person (a moderate, white, female Protestant born in the 1950s who had an average level of education, lived in Pennsylvania, and answered the question, "Do you have a work colleague, close friend, or relative who is gay or lesbian?" in 2004) and translates logit coefficients into probability changes. Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
